Contents
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Introduction |
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The Anti-Federalist Political Thought |
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2.1 |
The Size of the Union |
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2.2 |
Representation |
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2.3 |
Confidence and Attachment |
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3. |
The Communitarian Political Thought |
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3.1 |
Ill Liberalism |
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3.2 |
The Communitarian Society |
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4. |
One Road, Two Lanes |
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4.1 |
Conservatism |
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4.2 |
Republicanism -- Subsidiarity, Participation, and Civic Virtues |
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4.3 |
Institutionalism -- Political and Social |
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5. |
In Conclusion |
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Literature |
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"At the close of this century, we are again faced with a haunting feeling that things have gone awry in our democratic institutions. ... It falls on all of us to ask ourselves what kind of government we want and to become participants toward that end." |
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Robert Putnam/William Parent |
1. Introduction
"Are the Federalist Papers still relevant?", asks Kathleen Sullivan, professor of law at Stanford Law School, in an article connected with the "The New Federalist Papers" project of Twentieth Century Fund. Defending the ideas of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay against today’s critics of the federal government and of the American polity, Sullivan concludes: "The Anti-Federalists lost the constitutional battle at the end of the eighteenth century. Nothing has changed in two centuries to make them right at the end of the twentieth" (Sullivan 1995, 3).
Sullivan’s approach is certainly valuable, because it points to an important consideration: When political processes are criticized, not only current circumstances and developments, but also fundamental structures, and their underlying ideas, are to be examined. Thus, contemporary critiques of American government and society also have to take relevant past events and discussions into account. The making of the American Constitution, and the corresponding essays written by Federalists and Anti-Federalists, surely apply in this case. Not only in order to meet the standards of equal opportunity, but also in order to fully comprehend contemporary critiques, one should thus ask: Are the Anti-Federalist Papers still relevant?
The paper aims to link a certain group of current critics -- Communitarians -- to anti-federalist thought. On the first view, there are many more differences between Anti-Federalists and Communitarians than merely two centuries of political and social progress. Whereas Anti-Federalism is rural, soiled in the wide farmlands of a new and mainly still virgin continent, Communitarianism arouse in large, overcrowded, and anything but innocent cities of an end-twentieth century world power. Whereas Anti-Federalism defends the status quo of government at this time, Communitarianism attacks the status quo of society in the present days. Whereas Anti-Federalism seeks to conserve, Communitarianism seemingly attempts to reform.
To find, however, similarities between both, first the ideas of each will be explicated. Then, their common sentiments are to be illustrated, in order to, finally, judge about the relevance of anti-federalist thought with regard to communitarian criticisms today.
There are some works on the Anti-Federalists, and many more on Communitarianism. The so-called debate between Communitarianism and Liberalism often has been compared to thought-up disputes between Hegel and Kant, or Rousseau and Locke. Yet there is no specific attempt to link it to the debate over the American Constitution between Anti-Federalists and Federalist. Even the number of approaches to anti-federalist political thought itself is still rather small -- despite Herbert Storing’s "Complete Anti-Federalist" and its enlightening introduction, there are two other major works, which though focus more on the debate itself than on a deeper anti-federalist theory. With regard to Communitarianism analyses are numberless, but most of them concentrate on its philosophical side, which, ironically, is less relevant in this case. Thus, most of this work will reflect upon the actual writings produced by both lines of political thought.
To the extent that the most interesting questions will be asked at the end, and yet cannot be answered, the paper might perhaps appear as a mere introduction to a missing actual analysis. "On this, I would observe, that [papers] are not so necessary to [answer questions] as to [raise them]" (see CA 2.8.56).
2. The Anti-Federalist Political Thought
As mere critics of the proposed constitution the Anti-Federalists are not expected to have a comprehensive political philosophy from which to draw their opinions. And, indeed, they did not really have one. Yet it would be wrong to say that their criticisms did not ground on certain principles. Despite all the differences between the most conservative Anti-Federalists, who denied the need of revising the Articles of Confederation at all, and those who were converted, and finally compromised; there is a basic conception not only of ‘good government’, but of ‘good society’ in general, to which all of them subscribed. To reveal this common doctrine of Anti-Federalism one has to look at certain criticisms of the constitution, and to explore the basis of Anti-Federalist arguments.
Most of the Anti-Federalists’ objections dealt with the size of the Union, the matter of representation, and the power given to the national government. Proceeding on those major criticisms they discussed seemingly minor issues that yet express fundamental features of their political thought; issues as the jury trial, and confidence in government.
Due to all these points is their idea of good government, and, before that, their notion of human beings. The anti-federalist individual is born free, but in the need of social affiliation. "[I]ndividuals are fond of association, and have a mutual dependence upon each other" (CA 4.3.24). Together they form civil society, which is not a mere conglomeration of self-interest pursuing individuals, but considered as "a family, without partial affections, or even a domestic bickering; ... possessed of reason, genius and virtue" (CA 4.3.1). In short, "Civil society is a blessing" (ibd.).
However, the Anti-Federalists make it to link this community-oriented notion with the premise that men are born free, and have natural rights which are to be protected; by recognizing that individual liberty can only be preserved within community: "Men ... agree to enter into society, that by the united force of many the rights of each individual may be protected and secured" (CA 5.14.2).
To regulate this association of all, men institute government. To dissolve the natural tension between ruling and freedom, government has to have certain features. First of all, "it ought to be a free one, ... it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America" (CA 2.9.10).
Liberty is secured as long as the people themselves decide about it, rather than a single or collective independent ruler. Therefore good government is republican government.
2.1 The size of the Union
Because of their favor of republican government the Anti-Federalists first of all objected the size of the Union. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had dealt only with matters that could not be regulated by the state governments themselves, like foreign affairs, and concerns between the several states. Yet, the proposed Constitution, as the Anti-Federalists regarded it, would consolidate the states, extend the competencies of Congress over matters that, hitherto, were reserved for the states and, finally, create one national government, meaning one large republic. Quoting Montesquieu they doubted the feasibility of republican government in the consolidated Union:
"It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. ... In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extend, and of course are less protected" (CA 2.9.11).
A consolidated Union would have tried to amalgamate states too diverse to unite. The Anti-Federalists claimed, that the states varied to a great extend, and so did their people:
"The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the Union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite ... In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions ... This will retard the operations of government, and prevent such conclusion as will promote the public good" (CA 2.9.16).
The states could not be united under "a uniform system of laws", for by that they "would be unreasonably invaded" (CA 2.8.14). Yet, the Anti-Federalists’ objection to the size of the Union was by no means a raison d’être. Primarily, the vast extension of the area to be governed would not allow an appropriate, fair, and effective representation. Since the Anti-Federalists conceded that self-government could only be exercised by representation, they treated this issue with peculiar anxiety.
2.2 Representation
Representation, for the Anti-Federalists, is a compromise between democracy (or in their sense: republicanism), and effective government. Although in their opinion every step away from self-government, any institutionalization of agencies between the people and the rulers, means a dangerous step away from liberty, the Anti-Federalists admitted the necessity of representation.
"Experience has taught mankind, that legislation by representatives is the most eligible, and the only practicable mode in which the people of any country can exercise the right, either prudently or beneficially. But then, it is a matter of the highest importance, in forming this representation, that it be so constituted as to be capable of understanding the true interests of the society for which it acts, and so disposed as to pursue the good and happiness of the people as its ultimate end" (CA 2.9.45).
The proposed mode of representation, they said, did certainly not accomplish these requisitions. "Supposing, Congress should declare that there should be one representative for every thirty thousand of the people ... it would be incompetent to the great purposes of representation" (EA, 175).
First, the number of representatives was too small to display the different interests, manners, and habits of the American people. "[A] full and equal representation, is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all assembled" (CA 2.8.15). In a consolidated Union the diversity was much too large to be exposed by a body of less than fifty representatives. Therefore the laws that the representatives would pass -- provided that they were able to compromise at all -- could not reasonably apply to the different natures of those who were expected to obey:
"Unhappiness would be the product of such laws; for no state can be happy, when the laws contradict the general habits of the people ... [I]t is impossible for any single legislature so fully to comprehend the circumstances of the different parts of a very extensive dominion, as to make laws adapted to those circumstances" (CA 4.6.48). "It is much easier, to adapt the laws to the manners of the people, than to make the manners conform to the laws" (ibd.).
Secondly the people would barely know the men in whose hands they laid their political fate. In those rural times, when population density was rather low, an electoral district could cover a fairly large area. To choose one representative for thirty thousand people would mean to elect rather by accident, than selecting those who deserve the confidence of the people because of their frugality and devotion to the well-being of their constituencies.
[The representatives] "will consist of men, whose names [the people] have never heard, and whose talents and regard for the public good, they are total strangers to; and they will have no persons so immediately of their choice so near them, of their neighbours and of their own rank in life, that they can feel themselves secure in trusting their interests in their hands" (CA 2.9.49).
Once elected, for a tenure of two years, and without any precautions like rotation in office, or the possibility to recall them, they would be far off their constituents -- not only in space, but also in their minds.
Besides, they said, "[a]nother thing may be suggested against the small number of representatives, that but few of you will have the chance of sharing even in this branch of the legislature" (EA, 162). Thus, the chance to participate in politics decreased further. The people would be excluded twice -- physically, for the chances of being representatives were fairly small; and mentally, for their interests would not be represented. Generally, so the Anti-Federalists said, this Constitution will establish "a precedent for virtual representation" (CA 2.6.37), whereas the American Revolution actually was fought for actual representation.
For those reasons the Anti-Federalists were afraid (and sure) that the consolidated Union would give birth to a new aristocracy: the aristocracy of representatives who pursue the interest of -- currently speaking -- their clients, rather than the public good.
Moreover, the "constant clashing of opinions"(see p. 5) would divide the people from each other, and from their government. The government would be recognized rather a foe, political action rather an inconvenience or even an intrusion, than a blessing created by the people themselves. Jealousy and disinterest would replace confidence and trust. Then, the attachment of the people to their government, the vital basis of republicanism, was lost.
2.3 Confidence and attachment
Due to their republican doctrine, the Anti-Federalists emphasized strongly the need of confidence of the people in their government. One could draw their argument like this: The public order rests on obedience to the laws. Nobody could be expected to obey the laws, except he has had an active part in making them. Since the ruling of all by all was no longer practicable, and representation took the place, self-government could be no longer the basis for obedience. One had to trust the men who represented him and made the laws for him, and to be confident with his government on the whole. Individuals who felt a voluntary attachment to their government would voluntarily obey the laws of their government.
"The execution of the laws in a free government must rest on ... confidence, and this must be founded on the good opinion [the people] entertain of the framers of the laws. Every government must be supported, either by the people having such an attachment to it as to be ready when called upon to support it, or by ... force" (EA, 203).
Public confidence is created by responsible government, that is to say, a government for the people; which, though representative, performs as if it was one by the people; and which acts on the basis of accountability, created by strong links between the rulers and the ruled.
"The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave" (CA 2.9.18).
Hence, the Anti-Federalists favored short terms of office, rotation in office, and the possibility of recall from office. Representatives should be on a short leash, in order to preserve at least some features of self-government. Besides, confidence and attachment to the government grow with an increasing degree of involvement. The support on which government depends, lasts as long as the citizens are interested in politics, and participate actively in all of the different branches -- legislature, executive, and judiciary.
Thus, the Anti-Federalists stressed the importance of the trial by jury, which they saw endangered by the new Constitution. The trial by jury provides the involvement in the judicial branch, which they regarded as quite an important part of the system. "The real effect of this system of government, will ... be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial power" (CA 2.9.130). Therefore, the people had to partake in this branch. Serving as a juror they considered as important, firstly, as a way the people exercised self-government, and, secondly, because of its educational function:
"[The people’s] situation, as jurors ... enables them to acquire information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the society; and to come forward, in turn, as the centinels and guardians of each other" (CA 2.8.55) "[T]he jury trial brings with it an open and public discussion of all causes, and excludes secret and arbitrary proceedings. This, and the democratic branch in the legislature ... are the means by which the people are let into the knowledge of public affairs—are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon them. ... [So] we secure the people at large, their just and rightful controul in the judicial department" (CA 2.8.190).
Citing William Blackstone, the great English jurist and author, they concluded: "[T]rial by jury, and the liberty of the people [go] out together" (CA 3.11.40).
However substantial participation in the judiciary was, for the Anti-Federalists, their attention on the importance of participation in the two other branches cannot be overestimated. Since the legislative branch was already discussed (see ‘Representation’ pp. 4), the executive is to be briefly examined.
If participation in the executive branch had to be obtained, public offices should be within the reach of every citizen. Everyone had to have a chance to hold an office, and a right to choose the officeholder. "[B]y the frequency of elections, and the chance that everyone has in sharing in public business", both, responsibility and confidence, would increase. Laws made for the people and by the people will be executed for the people only by the people. Together, the key to good government is "participat[ion] in government, one of the principal securities of a free people" (EA, 162).
If participation in politics is insufficient, government lacks the confidence of the people. People would no longer support the government, because they do not see it as theirs but as an enemy; and would consequently no longer obey the laws voluntarily. To enforce the laws, government then has to rest on force -- and that would be the elimination of the last traces of republicanism and freedom.
Thus, Anti-Federalists feared a standing army, and opted for a well-regulated militia instead. A standing army, they suspected, would be employed not only to execute reasonable and fair laws. Sooner or later, the ruling aristocracy would abuse it, to enforce oppressing laws, and even unlawful actions.
"A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of the people, may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures" (CA 3.11.51).
Furthermore, the formation of a standing army would create a separate class, a group with a particular identity, which would not necessarily include only virtuous and noble features. This distinct group could get "a pernicious influence upon the morals, the habits, and the sentiments of society, and finally tak[e] a chief part in executing the laws" (EA, 158). The Anti-Federalists’ concern about the employment of a standing army seems quite irrelevant and ancient today. It wins back some of its notability, if one takes up the idea of Storing, who suggested to substitute the term ‘bureaucracy’ for ‘standing army’. Then, indeed, some lines read like a current criticism of the bureaucratic state.
The Anti-Federalists themselves already conceived, that a consolidation of the Union would build up an enormous bureaucracy:
"It may not be amiss to remind you of that swarm of revenue, excise, impost and stamp officers, continental assecors and collectors that your new constitution will introduce among you. They will, of themselves, be a STANDING ARMY to you ... They will be very adequate to give you a surfeit of their company, to make you tired in meddling with the government, and disposed to become indifferent about the exercise of it" (EA, 158).
Creating a national government meant for them creating ‘big government’, which had to be executed by a special class of politicians, or executives in general, rather than by the people. "If the people are not in general disposed to execute the powers of government, it is time to suspect there is something wrong in that government" (EA, 158). Once more they remarked the necessity of participation, as explained above.
Besides, Anti-Federalists emphasized the moment of education, especially civic education. A republican association requires a certain kind of citizens -- republican citizens, who have an awareness of politics, of liberty, and of community. Anti-Federalists claim that republics provided the environments that were needed to develop such a citizenry for they were "nurseries of great and able men" (EA, 161). In addition to that, government must take an active role in informing and instructing its subjects, to form them into free republican citizens:
"It is education which almost entirely forms the character, the freedom or slavery, the happiness or misery of the world. And if this Constitution shall be adopted I hope the Continental Legislature will have the singular honour, the indelible glory, of making it one of their first acts, in their first session, most earnestly to recommend to the several States in the Union, the institution of such means of education, as shall be adequate to the divine, patriotick purpose of training up the children and youth at large, in that solid learning, and in those pious and moral principles, which are the support, the life and soul of the republican government and liberty, of which a free constitution is the body; for as the body without the spirit is dead, so a free form of government without the animating principles of piety and virtue, is dead also, being alone" (CA 4.18.2).
As to see, there is another interesting point articulated by some Anti-Federalists: the need, and even essentiality, of morals and virtue. Although Anti-Federalists stressed individual liberty, at the same time they emphasized the significance of morality and virtues -- a kind of voluntary obedience not only of the legal laws but also of the traditional customs and habits, which one could call ‘social laws’ -- morals "which may render the people more capable of being a law to themselves" (CA 4.18.2). So, once again, they linked community-oriented and individualistic aspects by embedding each into the other.
In summary, the Anti-Federalists held that division between the people, and between them and their government -- by virtual representation, by factions and parties, by superior and independent judges, by a certain ruling class, by privileges and unreasonable differences, by a lack of confidence in government, and, eventually, by vicious and immoral demeanor -- would destroy public and private liberty. Thus, paradoxically, they objected unification for the sake of unity; they preferred to maintain separated in order to avoid division.
3. The Communitarian Political Thought
Like the Anti-Federalists, the Communitarians are rather critics than philosophers. Although especially the earlier exponents discuss their matters on a somewhat abstract level, the core of communitarianism -- Amitai Etzioni’s Communitarian Network -- is a more practical movement, and has no comprehensive and complete doctrine. In addition to that, the scope of communitarian thought is broad -- almost too broad to justify a label at all. Still, there is quite a great deal all the so-labeled Communitarians have in common; certainly with regard to their criticisms, and to some extend in their positive statements too.
Communitarianism came into light in the early 1980’s, primarily as critique of John Rawls’s "Theory of Justice", and, therefore, was rather an abstract and philosophical debate. At this time it dealt with issues like the embeddedness of the individual in its social context, and its ability whether or not to choose rationally. With Alasdair MacIntyre’s book "After virtue" Communitarianism fell into disrepute as conservative, sometimes even reactionary, yet in any case antiliberal. In 1984, Benjamin Barber’s "Strong Democracy" was published, and after that it was obvious that Communitarianism is not really a line of political thought, but a conglomeration of diverse conceptions, ranging from radically democratic to medievally moralistic expositions, from linguistic to sociological approaches. (There are even some works on ‘communitarian architecture’).
By writing an 18-pages article on "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" in 1990, Michael Walzer made it to end the debate. Plainly speaking, he reconciled Communitarianism and Liberalism by adjusting them to each other. Still there have been lots of articles being published, dealing with communitarian issues, but the either-Liberalism-or-Communitarianism question is solved. (Incidentally, it was solved the usual way: the problem was considered as being ambivalent.) What remained is Amitai Etzioni and his ‘Communitarian Network’, trying to raise a "neoprogressive, communitarian movement" (Etzioni 1993, 234). Etzioni succeeded in gathering all major Communitarians -- as co-editors, supporters, or associates -- since, despite all the differences, they have certain things in common.
3.1 Ill Liberalism
The canon of Communitarianism is its critique of philosophical as well as practical liberalism. Concerning the first, Communitarians attack the liberal construction of an ‘autonomous individual’ capable of choosing rationally and independently from its social environment. They claim that reality is different. People were born into communities, to which they are "indebted in a complex variety of ways for the constitution of [their] identity - to parents, family, city, tribe, class, nation, culture, historical epoch" (Sandel 1982, 143). Individuals gain personal identity only by reflecting themselves in their communities; they can reason and decide about themselves only with regard to others, only if they are embedded in a social structure that provides a framework for individuality. Yet, so Communitarians say, practical Liberalism (practiced Liberalism, so to speak) acts against those social entities. Since its ideology based on self-interest pursuing, autonomous and "presocial" (Walzer 1990, 20) individuals, it would be latently hostile towards communities of any sort, and has thus a destructive effect on social environments.
Moreover, Liberalism is "rights talk". It emphasizes rights and entitlements, but totally neglects corresponding responsibilities. Communitarians hold:
"Claiming rights without assuming responsibilities is unethical and illogical ... To take and not to give is an amoral, self-centered predisposition that ultimately no society can tolerate ... [T]hose most concerned about rights ought to be the first ones to argue for the resumption of responsibilities" (Etzioni 1993, 9-10).
The one-sided emphasis on rights in practiced Liberalism, so Communitarians say, is rooted in the theoretical liberal conception of the ‘unencumbered’ self. Uprooted from social meanings and community attachments, liberal individuals live in a "society of strangers, without character, without bonds, without identity" (Forst 1994, 31). They lost their shared understandings formed by culture and history; and -- lacking of any communal background -- have no choice but replacing them with neutral rights that do not express values but mere arrangements. Brought together, the liberal assumption of a presocial self, and the liberal assertion of unconditional rights result in a "rampant individualism" (Etzioni 1993, 118). Communitarians certainly would agree with Tocqueville, who had put the communitarian critique of liberal individuals as following:
"Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country" (Tocqueville 1840, vol. 2, 318).
Communitarians blame Liberalism not only for imbalances on the individual level. The inherent character of Liberalism, so they argue, also gave birth to faulty processes in the political sphere.
"As Sigmund Freud would say, there are no accidents. For every political pathology, as for personal ones, there is an underlying cause. Thus it is no accident that narrow, parochial interests often win in Washington these days ... These victories reflect the new powerful role that special-interest groups have acquired within the American polity ... These interest groups replace the democratic form of government with a government that largely heeds narrow, limited, self-serving groups" (Etzioni 1993, 226).
Thus, government is indebted to numberless special interests, and "overburdened with conflicts" (ibd., 6), instead of being responsive to the people at large. Due to this process people feel alienated. They have become indifferent about their government for "the polity is not theirs" (ibd., 262). Where they do not feel even a slight true interest in politics and in their government, confidence and attachment to it are, naturally, unknown.
"Over the past twenty-five years ... the proportion of Americans who have confidence in their leaders has dropped significantly ... Public opinion polls show that a majority of Americans believe that those in power do not care about their constituents" (ibd., 13).
Hence, people have turned away not only from their communities, but also from the political sphere; and retire now completely to their private lives. What Liberalism lacks is participation, community, and a certain kind of compassion people feel for their fellow citizens as well as for their government. What Liberalism has plenty of instead, is passivity, disaffection, and indifference.
So, what is to be done? Communitarians believe that one "must find a point of leverage outside the political world in order to be able to change it" (ibd., 227).
3.2 The Communitarian Society
There are, indeed, but few communitarian prescriptions for reforming the polity (despite some remarks by Etzioni on campaign finance reform, and PAC reform; and, partly, Benjamin Barbers "Strong Democracy"). While they do see structural deficits in the world of politics, at least Etzioni’s Communitarians rather appeal to ‘moral voices’:
"[T]his important moral realm ... has been much neglected ... [There is] an urgent need for a communitarian social movement to accord these voices their essential place" (Etzioni 1993, 254) ... Our society is suffering from a severe case of deficient we-ness and the values only communities can properly uphold; restoring communities and their moral voice is what our current conditions require" (ibd., 26).
Morals and social virtues are the key issue in communitarian ideas. Communitarians attribute (almost) all the undesirable developments that occur in contemporary American society to a lack of values and virtues. "[T]he deterioration of public and private morality, the decline of the family, high crime rates, and the swelling of corruption in government" (ibd., 2) on the first view might be due to wrong policies or insufficient law-enforcement; but basically they are the result of a society that has allowed its ties to become loose, and is now vegetating in boundless plurality and destructive relativity. So, shoring up morality -- reawaking the better side of (wo)man -- is what is needed to cure the illness of Liberalism.
Accordingly, Communitarians seek remedies in the nonpolitical, sometimes even private, world. They rely heavily on family values, moral education and social sanction for misbehavior. Altogether they attempt to restore and sustain communities.
"Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which all of us belong. Nor can any community long survive unless its members dedicate some of their attention, energy, and resources to shared projects" (ibd., 253). "[T]he mainspring of our values is the community or communities ... [W]e find reinforcement for our moral inclinations and provide reinforcement to our fellow human beings, through the community. We are each other’s keepers" (ibd., 31).
A communitarian society is a "community of communities" (ibd., 147). It is a harmonious mosaic made of personal communities like families and circles of friends, spatial communities like neighborhoods, cities and states, cultural communities like races, religions and life-style groups, and issue communities like Unions and markets; that are more or less in balance. In a communitarian society "each new generation acquires its moral anchoring ... in the family" (ibd., 256), and children go to schools that are "places where self-discipline is evolved" (ibd., 115), and that "educate for character" (ibd., 93). In a communitarian society many social services are provided by neighborhood groups and volunteers, and people are bound together by "caring, sharing, and being our brother’s and sister’s keeper" (ibd., 260).
Communitarians favor the principle of subsidiarity:
"Generally, no social task should be assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job. What can be done by families, should not be assigned to an intermediate group--school etc. What can be done at the local level should not be passed on to the state or federal level, and so on ... [T]o remove tasks to higher levels than is necessary weakens the constituent communities ... The government should step in only to the extent that other social subsystems fail, rather than seek to replace them" (ibd., 260).
By delegating more tasks to lower levels subsidiarity enhances the need of community building and sustaining. It turns people to care for each other, to become more self-disciplined and responsible, and to be each other’s keepers. Moreover subsidiarity results in "what has become fashionable to call empowerment—that is, enabling people to participate openly and directly in making decisions that govern their lives" (ibd., 142). Participation is the point where rather conservative and more radical Communitarians reunite. While both advocate what Barber has called ‘strong democracy’, for the first participation is but one character of community, for the latter a vital source for the existence of communities. Whereas Etzioni attempts to moral and civic education in school as prerequisite for being a community member, Barber states:
"Finally, however, only direct political participation—activity that is explicitly public—is a completely successful form of civic education (Barber 1984, 235)... Strong democracy alone seems capable of educating by practice and thus of preserving and enhancing democracy (ibd., 237) ... Participation, after all, enhances the power of communities and endows them with a moral force (ibd., 8).
Etzioni et al., in their ‘Responsive Communitarian Platform’ (Etzioni 1993, 253-267), call for communitarian families, communitarian schools, and communitarian neighborhoods; while Barber in his "Strong Democratic Program for the Revitalization of Citizenship" favors local assemblies, workplace democracy, and lay justice. Despite the different approaches, Communitarians agree about the need of institutions that help people to become socially virtuous, whether these are public or private, for "[i]n human beings, interestedness is given, virtue must be acquired" (Will 1995, 42).
In sum, Communitarians seek "to have a republic that is big, but in which life nevertheless is conducive to the virtues requisite for self-government" (Will 1995, 41). In the communitarian republic people know, respect and care for each other, they participate in a government that is responsive to the people at large rather than to interest groups, and live in a community of communities that grants them diversity but nevertheless embraces them to one unity.
4. One Road, Two Lanes
The mere comparison of terms used by Anti-Federalists and Communitarians hints at least a connection between the ideas of both. The favor of subsidiarity and participation, the emphasis on morals and virtues, the fear of (or complaint about respectively) factions and special interest groups, the stress on education, are anti-federalist as well as communitarian issues. Yet, despite these formal similarities, there are some deeper agreements, and sometimes almost a shared understanding of politics in general.
To develop a comparison of anti-federalist and communitarian thought the focus of the following comments is on positive statements rather than on criticisms, that nonetheless both often utter for one voice.
4.1 Conservatism
A striking similarity between Anti-Federalists and Communitarians is their conservative posture. The Anti-Federalists "were on the whole defenders of the status quo" (CA 1.2.7), and Communitarians, on the other hand, often seem to look backward to the glory days of republicanism.
Yet, anti-federalist conservatism is not only a taking-the-easy-road mentality -- seeking for comfortness by conserving the status quo; it is distrustful not only against changes, but also against the ‘latest findings of modern political science’, that the framers of the Constitution claimed to apply.
"There is nothing solid or useful that is new—and I will venture to assert, that if every political institution is not fully explained by Aristotle, and other ancient writers, yet that, there is no new discovery in this the most important of all sciences, for ten centuries back" (CA, 5.1.21).
The Anti-Federalists saw their opponents as "rash and know-it-all" youths (CA 1.2.7, n.2), who generally might have been right in their juvenile radicalism, but ought not to be trusted in so consequential a decision as framing a Constitution for present and future generations. Considering the weight and importance of such a matter, the Anti-Federalists could not help "to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect" (Oakeshott 1962, 169-170). The anti-federalist distrust in the proposed constitution, their suspicion against an ‘invented’ Union is alike the communitarian distrust in ‘political foundationalism’ (Barber 1988, 6). Though Anti-Federalists suspected the constitution for its uncertainty, whereas Communitarians suspect foundationalist liberalism precisely for its certainty, both rely rather on experience than on theoretical postulates -- as the Madisonian formula or the Rawlsian principles of justice. Both they mistrust independent truths, and confide more willingly in practical wisdom.
"Truth in politics seems, as William James said of truth in general, to be something which is ‘made in the course of experience’ rather than something discovered or disclosed and then acted upon. ... [T]ruth [is] a product of certain modes of common living rather than the foundation of common life" (Barber 1984, 65).
The Anti-Federalists thus trusted existing political institutions that were developed over time and expressed in covenants from the Mayflower Compact to the Articles of Confederation, rather than those that their opponents derived from abstract ‘truths’ of political science. Communitarian conservatism is similarly concerned in preserving traditional and well-tried institutions, even if these are rather civil than political ones. A case in point is the issue of justice: Communitarians rely on actual political processing to define justice, and on solidarity and charity to realize it; rather than on Rawls’s abstract difference principle, which is derived from scientific reasoning.
Both, Anti-Federalists and Communitarians share a preference for social continuity, affection for "the proliferating intricacy of long-established social institutions", and a "belief in ... moral order" (Orr 1995, 32), and, thus, conservative sentiments.
While the communitarian "goal is the reconstruction of civil society, the return of America to the self-governing republic described by Alexis de Tocqueville and envisioned by the founding fathers" (Schambra 1994, 32), the Anti-Federalists aimed to conserve precisely this American republic, at a time when it probably still existed.
4.2 Republicanism -- Subsidiarity, Participation, and Civic Virtues
The anti-federalist as well as the communitarian conception of a well-ordered society under good government is republican. Self-government, participation, responsive government, and a republican citizenry are main concerns of both lines of political thought. Yet, the major difference between them is their approach to republicanism -- to conservation, or revitalization respectively, of the American republican tradition. First, the similar ideas of Anti-Federalists and Communitarians are to be explained, before their different approaches will be discussed.
Because of their belief in the republican principle of self-government, Anti-Federalists and Communitarians favor participation and the principle of subsidiarity. Concerning the latter, they both find themselves as opponents of a strong national government, or of big government respectively. Consolidating the American states as well as creating big government means shifting certain decisions to the national level. Yet as the shift of tasks to the national government is also a shift of power to it, lower levels of society become weakened.
"One of the most capital errors in the system is that of extending the powers of the federal government to objects to which it is not adequate, which it cannot exercise without endangering public liberty, and which it is not necessary they should possess in order to preserve the union and manage our national concerns" (EA, 204).
"There are, of course, plenty of urgent task—environmental ones—that do require national and even international action. But to remove tasks to higher levels than is necessary weakens the constituent communities ... The government should step in only tot the extent that other social subsystems fail, rather than seek to replace them" (Etzioni 1993, 260).
The Anti-Federalists were concerned about the states on which the national government would encroach, the Communitarians worry about communities and civil institutions that are invaded, replaced and thus eradicated by the federal government. Both they are anxious that big government will destroy what is seen as the natural homes of liberty and self-government, and thus both favor the principle of subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity, for both, is prerequisite for participation in politics. Only if there are decisions within the reach of the people, people can make decisions. On the national level participation is rather impracticable, with regard to subject matters as well as to technical obstacles. The more important it becomes on lower levels. Hence there must be competencies on lower levels, whether owned by the states or by social subsystems, to perform in the political process of decision-making.
Participation in politics is seen, by both, as an essential feature of republicanism. In fact, it is the very exercise of self-government. So Anti-Federalists and Communitarians are opponents of the division of political labor, which breaks up citizens in subjects and rulers; and hold that politics is a common way of life rather than an expert business, and must therefore be performed by the many rather than the few. Thus, participation in all branches of government -- as representative, voter, or member of a township/neighborhood-assembly, in the legislature; as civil servant, whether professional or layperson, vocational or occasional, in the executive; and as juror in the judiciary, is vital for a republic. Participation promotes several purposes. First, there is the formal fact of being included in decisional processes. Despite that, participation furthermore carries educating and socializing effects. Finally, participation influences the acting of government itself.
Participation links the people with politics. By participating in any of the governmental branches people step out of their private kingdom and into the public political realm. Here they get information about their government as well as about their fellow citizens, and not least about politics itself. Here they learn abilities needed for the exercise of self-government, they learn to use their rights and plead their cause, while, at the same time, they learn how to compromise with others that also claim rights and pursue interests. Participatory activities "are the means by which the people are let into the knowledge of public affairs—are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon them" (CA 2.8.190).
Despite its educating purpose, participation is necessary to protect the great project of self-government against autocratic encroachments. The Anti-Federalists did not become tired to warn of an undemocratic aristocracy of politicians taking over sovereignty from the people. Communitarians on the other hand are concerned about the dominion of undemocratic institutions like courts and bureaucracies over democratic bodies like the legislature. So, Anti-Federalists and Communitarians agree upon the necessity of an active citizenry occupying the public sphere, for "Politics, more even than nature, abhors a vacuum. Where citizens will not act, judges, bureaucrats, and finally thugs [standing armies respectively] rush in" (Barber 1984, 111). People who became indifferent about politics, for they have no voice in it, and became indifferent about their fellow citizens, for they share no common activity; provide a nutritious ground for the kind of benevolent despotism, Tocqueville already warned against:
"Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood. ... For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living? ... After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. ... The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd." (Tocqueville 1840, vol. 2, 318).
By the joint exercise of self-government people acquire not only practical, but also moral abilities. In republican communities "the individual members are transformed, through their participation in common seeing and common work, into citizens." (Barber 1984, 232). In their private kingdoms they still might be rather selfish than altruistic, rather indifferent than concerned; but acting in public space they are rendered to acquire certain republican virtues, certain modes of behavior that are more responsive and responsible towards their political community and its inhabitants. Eventually, virtues acquired and practiced in the public sphere will spill over to the privacy of their individuality as well. Result of this would be a republic inhabited with "caring and sharing" (Etzioni 1993, 260) citizens, bond together by what Communitarians in reference to Aristotle call ‘homonoia’ (Spragens 1990, 123) -- political friendship; a society like "a family, without partial affections, or even a domestic bickering" (CA 4.3.1), in which political conflict is a means to live with rather than a cause to break with each other.
Being the key-issue for Communitarians, virtues and values are also the deeper points of anti-federalist thought. Both they fully comprehend the indispensability of moral foundation of a republican house. "A republican, or free government", they say, "can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous" (CA 2.7.9). Moreover, both they have the idea that a certain social class is the upholder of morality.
"The circumstances in which men are placed in a great measure give a cast to the human character. Those in middling circumstances have less temptation—they are inclined by habit and the company with whom they associate, to set bounds to their passions and appetites ... hence the substantial yeomanry of the country are more temperate, of better morals and less ambition" (CA 6.12.17).
"The kind of practical virtue we need ... is more likely to be found in the lower middle class ... The lower middle class is the inheritor of a democratic tradition that always insisted that small property ownership was likely to promote the habits desirable from the point of view of democratic citizenship--responsibility, accountability, loyalty and steadfastness. ... In class terms, they are the bearer of the American future. Their practical virtue ought to guide American culture in the next century" (Gardels 1991, 34).
Whereas Anti-Federalists criticize that the Constitution does not make sure that this class has an active part in government, and thus stress the political importance of it, Communitarians merely emphasize the social significance of the middle class as a source of morals and virtue. In anti-federalist thought the middle class is important because its members as citizens constitute society’s moral foundation, and as rulers frame a humble government that can be trusted. In communitarian thought the value-providing middle class serves merely as a social upholder of a humble citizenry, but is regarded less important respecting its political role. (This points to the major difference between both, which will be discussed soon).
Participation also has a positive impact on how government performs. Where Anti-Federalists fear the destructive power of factions, Communitarians complain about the occupation of politics by special-interest groups. Both they are afraid that monolithic groups, pursuing purposes distinct from the rest of the people, invade the political sphere and "prevent such conclusion as will promote the public good" (CA 2.9.16). Communitarians assume that an active citizenry renders the government to be more responsive to the people at large rather than to special-interest groups, for if the people have a voice in politics and make heard of themselves, government will answer them. Anti-Federalists in this point are less believing, and rely rather on a political framework that forces government not only to be responsive, but to be responsible for its action as well.
Finally, as Liberalism for Communitarians is a mere art of creating an artificial equilibrium of powers, a theory of "keeping men apart rather than ... bringing them together" (Barber 1984, 21) and inconsistent with the social nature of republicanism; Federalism, as developed by the Anti-Federalists’ opponents, was by the Anti-Federalists seen as a similarly lifeless system of fragile checks and balances:
"If you make the citizens of this country agree to become the subjects of one great consolidated empire of America, your government will not have sufficient energy to keep them together: Such a government is incompatible with the genius of republicanism ... What can avail your specious imaginary balances, your rope-dancing, chain-rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contrievances?" (CA 5.16.2).
Whereas Anti-Federalists and Communitarians are considerable unanimous with regard to how society and government ought to be, they differ much about how this can be achieved.
4.3 Institutionalism -- Political and Social
To put it easy, one could say, that Anti-Federalists think of society and government from top to bottom, Communitarians, on the other hand, from bottom to top. What is meant by that, is, that Communitarians rely on the strength of the institutions of civil society -- family, schools, churches, neighborhoods. If these institutions are in good shape, then society and government almost necessarily are well functioning. Though they sporadically take up positions regarding the polity, they criticize processes rather than propose reforms. Only Benjamin Barber’s "Strong Democracy" deals with structural matters; and could be read, to some extent, as an outline of a reformed polity, if he was not concerned only with local levels. Generally, Communitarians are social rather than political reformers.
Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, were similarly concerned with the importance of social institutions, yet, beyond that, they understood, that not only a political system is a function of society, but, vice versa, society is a function of its political structure as well. Thus they were what seems quite overcritical and hairsplitting today, criticizing the proposed Constitution wherever they could, and arguing about minor issues as if they were fundamental questions. The reason for their ‘nit-picking’ is, that they knew: First, human beings form their institutions; and then, institutions form human beings. So they disliked an ‘invented’ political framework, that did not rest in well-tried traditions; and then, since they did subscribe to the idea of a ‘new world’, they urged people to be careful with what they were about to create, for the impact of a creation as this would be much weightier than one would like to expect.
The communitarian approach to republicanism could thus be described as ‘social institutionalism’, whereas Anti-Federalists access republicanism in a way one could characterize as ‘political institutionalism’. Quintessentially, the republican idea of both is this: Republicanism is grounded on the principle of self-government. Conceding the inevitability of representation, government must be responsive (with regard to Anti-Federalists even responsible) to those who are represented. This requires an active citizenry interested beyond their own selfish matters in the public good, defined by common values. Finally, a republic rests on the civic virtues of its citizens (and on the political virtues of its government), which are grounded in a common morality.
Communitarians approach this conception from its social side ("a point of leverage outside the political world", Etzioni 1993, 227). They emphasize common morality and civic virtues as the heart of republicanism, and, hence, concentrate their critique as well as their positive conception on individuals, and social institutions (families, schools) that uphold these elements. Anti-Federalists, conversely, focus on the issues of self-government and responsible government; they criticize the lack of provisions for both in the Constitution, and, thus, demand political institutions like rotation in office and recall. One could say that both attempt to an active citizenry that somehow pursues ‘the public good’ -- Anti-Federalists seek to accomplish that, as it was said before, ‘from top to bottom’ through certain political institutions; Communitarians, on the other side, ‘from bottom to top’ through certain social institutions.
The question, that remains to be solved (and will remain to be solved), is: Do the points of the communitarian critique result from those items of the political framework of the Constitution, that the Anti-Federalists criticized in those days? That is to say: Does the American Constitution suffer from certain flaws since its birth? And resulting from that: Is the political framework to be changed? Or is the communitarian approach right? What would anti-federalist critics say today?
5. In Conclusion
It would be rather obscure to state superficially explicit links between anti-federalist forewarnings and communitarian criticisms; such as: "There were no such problems as the public debt, special-interest groups, or political passivity, if the consolidation of the United States in 1787 would not have been admitted." Yet, logically, the Constitution, which was created then, has been having an impact on the state of the Union ever since. And, what is obvious now, there is a connection between, e.g. the anti-federalist complaints about too few opportunities to participate in government, and the communitarian lament over a passive, morally degenerated citizenry. Or, as another example: Where Communitarianism asks why the public good plays almost no role in todays politics, it would be helpful to regard the corresponding anti-federalist criticism. The proposed Constitution, the Anti-Federalists said, will "prevent such conclusion as will promote the public good" (CA 2.9.16); indeed, it even avoids to take the public good into consideration at all, and, instead, presupposes numerous factions, assuming that with a great number of factions there is a neutralizing effect, so that no single special interest dominates (see Federalist Paper no. 10). The communitarian critique rarely reaches so far that it would question the basic political framework. When Communitarians say that government must be more responsive, they never take into account, that there must exist some tools, to make government more responsive; and that therefore one also has to talk about constitutional provisions that might to be changed.
Not more than superficial links of blame as above are reasonable, superficially derived remedies, such as disempowering the federal government by removing all tasks except international ones, apply. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the basic political framework once in a while, and to consider the appropriateness of its components to the status of society. To deal with substantial problems, substantial questions have to be asked: Is the political structure adequate to solve these problems? Is society still so constituted as it was supposed to be at the framing of its political institutions? Or, in other words: Who would be the better adviser in these days -- Communitarians or Anti-Federalists?
Anti-Federalists today would probably be Communitarians. Yet, beyond the ideas they share with Communitarianism, they would take not only the social and individual, but also the political and structural, into account. Thus, Anti-Federalists and Communitarians would complement one another quite well, to effectively examine not only the American house, but also its groundwork. In a world that is expelled to complexity, inconsistencies, and growing problems, carefully and thoroughly reasoned actions are needed more than ever to achieve lasting effects. Here Communitarians and Anti-Federalists both are certainly right: The people at large are to employ their mental, social, and moral competencies in order to defend politics against bureaucracy, autocracy, and anarchy.
"It falls on all of us to ask ourselves what kind of government we want and to become participants toward that end" (Putnam/Parent, 1991, B5).
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